Military doctrine of Ukraine and its adequacy in the framework of European integration
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Passing a set of national security and defence acts on June 8, 2012, including the National Security Strategy of Ukraine “Ukraine in a Changing World” and the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, was preconditioned by finalizing the new foreign-policy line of the country as well as final consolidation of regime headed by V. Yanukovych, who took political power in 2010. Difference between foreign, security and internal policies of V. Yanukovych and the previous political power was as follows: it stipulated, first of all, abandoning the prospect of NATO membership, legal support for non-aligned status and the growing rapport with Russia in the format of in depth strategic partnership. Secondly, Yanukovych’s domestic policy targeted at dismantling democratic set up in the country and building an autocratic and kleptocratic regime.

Accordingly, these dramatic changes in foreign, domestic and security policies required substantial adjustments in the guiding documents that had fixed the course of EU and NATO membership and strengthened the democratic mode in Ukraine: the National Security Strategy of Ukraine ratified by Decree of the President of Ukraine V. Yushchenko of February 12, 2007 № 105 and the Military Doctrine of Ukraine ratified by Decree of the President of Ukraine L. Kuchma of June 15, 2004 № 645. The new wording of the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine kept the European integration vector, however, provisions related to democratic control over security sector and the Armed Forces of Ukraine were exempt. This development considerably weakened civil and parliamentary control over uniformed services which at that moment were reoriented from neutralizing external threats to exercising predominantly police functions, with involvement of armed units domestically.

The above changes of political nature failed to comply with the basic principles of European integration and the EU standards. On the other hand, the new wording of both the Military Doctrine and the National Security Strategy of Ukraine were the logical follow up in implementing provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy of Ukraine” passed by Verkhovna Rada on July 1, 2010. This Law has fixed the key changes in Yanukovych’s policy.

In addition, the new wording of the Military Doctrine and the National Security Strategy of Ukraine reflected those changes that had actualized not just in domestic policy, but in the international security environment. Thus, in particular, preamble of the National Security Strategy declared as follows: “Ukraine-targeted geopolitical influences with various vectors coupled with lack of efficient guarantees of this nation’s security, “frozen” border conflicts and dramatic dependence of the national economy on external supplies make Ukraine vulnerable, weaken its role in the international arena and push it to the periphery of global policy into “safety grey area”.
We witness a dangerous trend of revising the national borderline outside the international law norms. Resort to force and threat of using force are back in the practice of international relations, including Europe.

The National Security Strategy of Ukraine was adopted, for the first time, in 2007, but never was a guiding document in public authorities’ operations, as the government was excessively focused on achieving short-term political and economic goals and ignored the needs to strategically develop society and the state. This approach resulted in the growing threat to national security and decreasing capacity to protect Ukraine’s national interests”.

The above strategic documents show specifics compared to the Western legal tradition: their content and purpose differ substantially from similar documents applied in the international practice, in particular, as they are implemented in the EU member’s practice. In Ukraine the National Security Strategy is a more general document than the National Military Strategy of Hungary or the Defence Strategy of Slovak Republic, as it embraced not solely military, but also other areas of national security, such as political, economic, media related and ecological ones. In this light it is comparable with the US National Security Strategy. The content in defence and military strategies of the EU nations or in NATO strategic concepts respond to the level of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine.

As we compare definitions in the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, in the National Military Strategy of Hungary and the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, we see both similarities and differences. There are the same components in the National Security Strategy of Ukraine and the National Military Strategy of Hungary. In this aspect, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine boils down to defining the general line, which is a shortcut to the fixed goal, as well as the modes to achieve this goal. However, the National Military Strategy of Hungary deals exclusively with defence area, while the National Security Strategy of Ukraine stipulates the ways and means to protect Ukraine’s national security on the whole, including the military sphere.

At the same time, the National Military Strategy of Hungary is not a purely military strategy, in the sense of the highest level of the art of war, and covers the theory and practice of making the armed forces ready for a war as well as planning and conduct of strategic operations and wars on the whole. In addition, the Hungarian strategy formulates the basic principles for military policy, which cover not just preparation of the armed forces to the defensive actions, but also using them in the international arena for political purposes. The very title of the National Military Strategy of Hungary is not a random choice. The Hungarian strategy is getting close to the Military Doctrine of Ukraine. However, the Military Doctrine of Ukraine is largely based on Soviet traditions. Unlike the Strategy, it includes formulation and the main guidance for the following of public policy components: military policy, military and technology policy, military industrial and military economic policy.

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1 Стратегія національної безпеки України «Україна у світі, що змінюється» http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389/2012

2 As the law stipulates, the National Security Strategy of Ukraine defines the general principles, priority goals, objectives and mechanisms to protect the vital interests of an individual, of society and the State from external and internal threats.

The National Military Strategy of Hungary defines the key principles, the strategic goals, the lines, tools and resources that enable Hungarian defence forces to exercise their mission.

The Military Doctrine of Ukraine is the system of guiding opinions as to emergence, core and nature of modern military conflicts as well as using military force to protect sovereignty, territorial integrity and other vital national interests of the State. The Doctrine presents the main goals, principles and priorities of the military policy of Ukraine.
At the same time, content of the new wording of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine substantially differs from Soviet doctrines and Cold War doctrines, which presented the system of concepts as to war and preparation of the nation and its armed forces to wage a war as well as basic war formats. Thus, traditional military doctrines formulated the defence policy, goals and principles guiding preparation of national defence. In this new wording of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, the core of its content – a war - is substituted with a military conflict. Consequently, the Doctrine loses the task to defend the country and instead formulates the task to prevent and eliminate or neutralize a military conflict. As there are various ways to resolve a conflict, the armed forces are in fact liberated from implementing the task to organize defence of the country while use of military force turns into collateral mission. At the same time, priority is given to political, diplomatic and other non-military means.

This transformation of Military Doctrine content was determined, in some way, by groundless and widely spread opinion on low probability of a war or a military conflict, thus not a single country was considered to be an enemy. There are similar formulations in the EU Common Foreign Security Policy and NATO strategy concept. The National Military Strategy of Hungary has these similar formulations about insignificant risk of aggression, both in short- and mid-term prospects, about low probability of an armed conflict, but the possibility to face it was not excluded. Accordingly, the whole mix of tasks in relation to moving the country on war footing, preparing mobilization, managing military economy and national defence as well as building capacity of the armed forces was no longer at the top of agenda. On similar grounds, the Ukrainian Doctrine points out that prevention and neutralization of armed conflicts must be carried out by the available personnel in the armed forces, staffed on contractual basis. Existence of strong reserve forces was not foreseen.

The Hungarian Military Strategy, on the contrary, stipulated that, with resources being limited, defence of the country be provided through both training capable reserve and contracting professional army. An army per se is perceived as an element of the backup system of Hungary. Thus, the National Military Strategy of Hungary is based on national defence needs.

The Military Doctrine of Ukraine is based on the National Security Strategy of Ukraine and serves as the legal ground for designing a strategy and a concept for reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time, the Ukrainian Military Doctrine framework provides for broader space to formulate political goals, use military force and justify military policy on science grounds. In this sense the Military Doctrine of Ukraine has more detailed scientific and methodological base, although its log frame is similar to the National Military Strategy of Hungary and other EU members.

The content of Military Doctrine of Ukraine differs from the content of National Military Strategy of Hungary in the following way: core target for the Ukrainian Doctrine is a military conflict, and not defence of the country or defence and security of its allies. Any military conflict, as an object in the Ukrainian Doctrine, defines the content of this Doctrine Chapters. One of strengths of the Ukrainian Doctrine is the categorical framework and science based grounds for the methodology to examine military and political environment.

Assessment of military and political environment is carried out in the light of vector, informed intent and actions of the parties. If intentions and actions of the other party in military and political relations can harm the national interests of Ukraine just indirectly, under some conditions, then they are categorized as a military and political risk. If the other party in military and political relations expresses intentions or performs actions that do not account of Ukraine’s interests (that means “wilfully”), then these intentions and actions are categorized as a military
and political challenge. If the other party in military and political relations expresses intentions or performs actions which confirm its readiness to resort to force against Ukraine, then these intentions and actions are categorized as a threat of resort to military force.3

For the first time the new wording of the Doctrine has clearly described the key features of modern military conflicts, global trends in development of military and political environment as well as threats to international security liberated by these trends. Taking into account specifics in development of Ukraine, the document defines internal context that limits scope for the state to strengthen its defence capacity and can provoke acts of aggression by foreign countries. Design of the Doctrine was based on clear understanding of a totally new, more variable and camouflaged mechanism that drives modern armed conflicts with the following key features:

- foreign support for domestic political forces (financing, training in methods and means of civil resistance, training of special paramilitary units);
- arming domestic political forces in all accessible ways, including illegal supply of light weapons, that promotes formation of illegal paramilitaries;
- involvement of illegal paramilitaries in terrorist attacks or provocations with use of weapons against government police forces or civilian population of other religious denomination, other nationality, etc. as well as occupation of some administrative territories;
- global media campaign for discrediting a political regime and focus on its anti-popular nature;
- direct armed aggression against a state;
- variety of instruments used during escalation of tension in external and internal relations (first of all, media and psychological means, political and economic pressure, sanctions);
- abandoned intent to capture territory of a country or alter its state borders as an ultimate goal in a conflict; aspiration to gain only political and economic control over government and access to nation’s resources4

Recently these features have been typical features of military conflicts in North Africa and Middle East in the period of so-called Arab Spring.

At the same time, conclusions formulated on the basis of the above solid methodology for assessing military and political environment turned out to be a misthink. Eventually it resulted in loss of this nation’s territorial integrity and direct threat of losing the state sovereignty.

The Doctrine considers three probable formats of military conflict (Article 12), in particular:

- **an armed conflict** may actualize in a limited armed clash at the state border between Ukraine and another state (**an armed conflict at the state border**) or in armed clashes within inland Ukraine (**an inland armed conflict**) with involvement of illegal paramilitaries or armed units. Its negative outcome, in terms of national security, qualifies for significant one. In specific situations it is possible that an armed conflict expands in a local war;

- **a local war** may be an outcome of the armed aggression against Ukraine by another state in the region. Negative outcome for national security of Ukraine qualifies for disastrous one;

- **a regional war** may be an outcome of the armed aggression by two or more states against Ukraine. Negative outcome for national security of Ukraine qualifies for irreversible one.

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On the basis of the above grades, the following conclusion is present in Article 13: “Taking into account the trends and determinants of developments in military and political environment globally, Ukraine concludes that an armed aggression, which may result in local or regional war against it, is improbable in a medium-term prospect”.² Less than in two years we face reality of war.

Definition of the above armed conflict formats guide the following conclusion: should we choose goals and outcome of these conflicts as their identification criteria, why a regional war cannot be launched by a large nearby country labelled «a regional state» by the US President B. Obama. It is obvious that Doctrine drafters kept in mind the coalition of NATO countries as a subject of such a conflict. Moreover, the National Military Strategy of Hungary prioritizes a regional war due to being a part of coalition, while involvement in a local war is almost eliminated thereof.

According to the Doctrine, a local war may be initiated only by another nation in a region. Herewith, the region and features of such a nation are not specified. On the basis of this interpretation it’s possible to conclude that Russia, for example, will pursue just limited local goals, should it get engaged in a war with Ukraine. Reality demonstrated that Russia started military aggression with a local war while having goals of much broader scale. This forms the grounds to expect the possible transformation of this local war into the regional one. Consequently, conclusions presented in Article 13 of the Doctrine have the following features:

- firstly, they echoed the political tone of Yanukovych authoritarian regime that a priori perceived NATO and the West as opponents, while Russia was a potential ally;
- secondly, these conclusions served as kind of excuse for lack of operational efficiency and capacity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to perform their basic mission stipulated in Article 17 of the Constitutions of Ukraine - to protect state sovereignty and territorial integrity in the face of military aggression.

Thus, while assessment of military and political environment based on military science was valid, its political element was a failure.

In Chapter III of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, it is worth to look at the setting for an armed conflict to evolve and military force to be used. Article 19 has rather clear and specific description of this environment. However, regardless clarity of the presentation these conditions never served grounds for passing the respective strategic resolutions as to prevention of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.

Other provisions in this Chapter suggest that the Armed Forces be actually deprived of their functions in measures to prevent a military conflict. At prevention stage of a military conflict preference is given to political and diplomatic means only.

The following are the ground principles of Ukraine’s military policy on prevention of military conflicts:

- validity of military policy should be justified;
- observance of non-bloc and nuclear-free status;
- co-ordination and agreement of actions at intergovernmental level.

Unfortunately, whatever perfect may be the level of scientific validity of military policy, it fails to stop an aggressor guided by completely different, far from scientifically grounded motivation and intentions. Coordination of actions at the international level turned out to be inefficient. The international community response to Russia’s aggression was weak, partly contradictory, lacked systemic approach and adequacy. Russian veto blocked passing any decision on protection of territorial integrity of Ukraine at the level of UN Security Council. The United Nations failed to operate its observation mission in the Crimea occupied by Russian troops.

Non-bloc status is considered, according to Article 18 of the Military Doctrine, to be “a key factor” in decreasing tension in military and political environment in the region, but in reality this status facilitated increase in tension, as the aggressor was sure that non-bloc Ukraine will fail to get external military assistance and is incapable of independent resistance to military aggression. Ukraine’s waiver of collective defence principle resulted in reinforcement of Kremlin’s aggressive claims, on one hand, and generated weak and inadequate NATO response on the other. Having neither legal nor political ground, the Alliance limited itself to rather weak statements and other soft diplomatic measures to respond to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.

In addition, the statement on adhering to non-bloc policy to be an important factor to decrease tension in military and political environment in the region is in contrast with General Provisions of the National Security Strategy of Ukraine. Provisions point out that “there is an evidence for a dangerous tendency to revise the national borders outside the international law framework”, and that guarantees for Ukraine’s security lack efficiency.

Thus, the contrasting provisions of the Doctrine entail the following conclusion: political and diplomatic tools without their reinforcement with military force fail to be effective. In a military conflict, at all stages of its evolvement, political and diplomatic tools must serve just as auxiliary means. As Ukraine considered them to be the key, any option involving use of military force was ignored.

Means to prevent a military conflict, as they were defined in Article 17 of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, turned out to be similarly ineffective and unproductive. Some of them appeared unreal in general terms, particularly, “legal arrangements with respect to the international guarantees granted to Ukraine in connection with nuclear disarmament”. On the other hand, this vector of “expanding international cooperation on issues linked to development of administrative and territorial units with territories adjacent to the state borders of Ukraine”, promoted growth of separatism and collaborator sentiments with respect to aggressor in the Eastern regions of Ukraine neighbouring with Russia and supported aggressor’s belief in easy and complete victory in war with Ukraine. Other means, like, for example, “safeguarding information security”, were totally ignored or not taken into account.

Finally, here are actions for Ukraine to undertake in compliance with Article 20 of the Military Doctrine to restrain a military aggressor. The Doctrine does not stipulate numerous actions, but it is necessary to act as follows:

- intensify activities in international media space;
- appeal to the UN Security Council, other international and regional organizations, influential states, the states that guaranteed Ukraine’s security in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances with respect to implementation of deliberate denial of the use of military force against Ukraine;
- introduce the legal regime of martial law (or the state of emergency);
- demonstrate national defence posture, readiness and determination to defeat aggression, capability to inflict unacceptable losses to a potential aggressor.

Instead, in real life we exhibited disability of defence, lack of readiness and determination to defeat aggression, overall inability and unwillingness to inflict any harm to the aggressor. Appeal to the UN Security Council generated no tangible effects, except for a discussion and passing extensive non-regulatory statements by the UN General Assembly. The nations that guaranteed security of Ukraine and were the signatories of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances failed to try and meet. Moreover, one of the signatories (Russia) acted as aggressor, and China abstained from any decisions and statements in support of Ukraine. Martial law was not introduced in Ukraine either at the beginning of military aggression, or while it lasted.

The very reason for military and political leadership of the nation showing lack of action and capacity roots in the invalid assessment of the existing threats as well as inability to adopt strategic decisions and implement them. There were no efficient means and adequate resources to deter aggression.

Comparison of Ukrainian point of view with assessment of military and political situation in the National Military Strategy of Hungary reveals big difference. In particular, the National Military Strategy of Hungary points at the general global trend of increase in "soft threats" and no decrease in military ones. However, this trend exists in parallel with international security and stability vector while crisis is notable only in some regions. There are non-military threats too: decline in solidarity within the EU; cyber terrorism and information warfare; deficit of defence budget; nuclear arms escalation; illegal migration, etc. Risk of aggression against Hungary is considered to be low.

Based on the above assessment of threats at low level, the Hungarian Strategy formulates the key requirement to the Armed Forces of Hungary: to be capable of achieving national defence goals within NATO framework and national security goals in the EU framework with accent on transatlantic connections and the European defence potential. Consequently, for the purpose of achieving the above goals, the Hungarian Strategy formulated the following tasks to be implemented by the Armed Forces of Hungary: defence of the territory and air space of the nation; strengthening its international reputation and making its contribution to NATO and EU defence potential. The collective defence concept is established as the key principle for the military posture of Hungary.

There are two factors deciding on difference in assessments of military and political environment presented in the strategic documents of Ukraine and Hungary. Firstly, Hungary is a member of NATO and makes the principle of collective defence its ground principle. That significantly reinforces its defence capacity as well as security and defence guarantees in the face of external aggression. Secondly, Hungary is positioned in far better environment, security and geopolitics wise, when Ukraine, as a nation in a buffer zone, faces considerably higher level of threats to its national security. However, the limited resource potential in Hungary’s defence area is the bottleneck.

**Resources.** The defence budget of Hungary makes 0.1% of its GDP. According to the Military Strategy, it is to reach the level of 1.39% of GDP only by 2020. For comparison: the defence budget of Ukraine was to be 1.07% of GDP, with defence expenditures of 0.98%, while the Law of Ukraine “On the Armed Forces of Ukraine” stipulated the level of 3% of GDP. However, in Hungary, the defence expenditure structure meets the international standards, which is not the case with defence budget in Ukraine. The allocation of funds to finance the Armed Forces is
40:30:30 in Hungary (service pay and allowances/military training and education/designing weapons and military machinery). This proportion in the defence budget of Ukraine makes 82:5.7:12.3. The plans for the Armed Forces reform in Ukraine stipulate that the structure of defence budget should have distribution of allocations in proportion of 42:25:32 in 2015.

Limited funds and human resources make a specific feature of the Hungarian defence make up. This deficit is compensated through the system of collective defence, optimal military structure, rational procurement, maintenance and use of multinational cooperation options employing the existent military equipment and elimination of the overlapping tasks in NATO and EU frameworks. Special attention is paid to growth of Hungarian assets in NATO Response Force and EU battle teams. The plans are to expand human resources of the Armed Forces of Hungary through enhancement of their quality: higher motivation, selection of leaders, quality of the combat training, increase in efficiency of cooperation with allies.

The National Military Strategy of Hungary points out an important prerequisite for efficiency in operations of Hungarian defence forces: adjustment of their set up, command and control; implementation of the integrated and module systems; capability to perform tasks in the autonomous mode. An important line in development of defence posture in Hungary is enhancing its system of defence planning in compliance with NATO planning cycles and the process of EU capacity building.

Development of military potential of Hungary in mid- and long-term perspective shall have the following focus:

a) arrival of allies to defend the nation in the framework of NATO collective defence system depending on the situation and degree of aggression;

b) being instrumental with respect to collective defence posture of the Alliance to act in support of a host country;

c) support Alliance in the framework of the collective defence of Hungary, in compliance with its commitments;

d) assist in development of anti-crisis management solutions in the EU and the operations within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework;

e) being in a position to take part in the whole range of operations, in low intensity stabilization operations under high combat intensity;

f) activities related to skills of fighting natural calamities, capacity to take part in overcoming of natural and industrial disasters as well as eliminate their aftermath.

If we compare the Hungarian system to keep the nation prepared for defence and the Ukrainian approach to defence readiness presented in Chapter IV of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, we find significant difference. The Ukrainian system of national preparedness to defend the national interests (not the national defence!) with arms stipulates the two phase process: actualization of a military conflict, then its containment and neutralization.

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According to Article 23 of the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, preparedness to defend with arms the national interests shall focus on the following priorities:

- enhancing management system responsible for preparing the state to defend its national interests with arms through timely detection, review and science based forecast of military and political risks, challenges and threats to resort to military force against Ukraine;
- improving functions, formulation of objectives for the military units and special purpose units in compliance with defence sufficiency principle and optimizing their quantity/quality features;
- efficient use of the centralized personnel management system; enhancement of personnel selection system for staffing military units and special purpose units to raise their professional level;
- raising efficiency of military and patriotic education of Ukraine’s nationals, safeguarding prestige of military service, enhancing life-support system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military commands;
- growing operative and combat (special) capacities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military commands through supply of the updated, modernized and new weapon systems, military and special purpose machinery, maintaining the adequate levels of military efficiency, mobilization and combat readiness;
- modernizing the system of national mobilization preparedness in compliance with the implemented reforms and economic feasibility.

To what degree the above guidelines were effective in reality? The concept of “defence sufficiency” was introduced back in Soviet Union times and was operational in Ukraine. However, both the Military Doctrine and other instruments have failed define defence sufficiency criteria for Ukraine. There is no exact indication of the benchmark country in terms of defence sufficiency. The level of conflict intensity that limits our defence potential was not specified either. As the Military Doctrine points out low probability of military conflicts, there was no urgent need to decide on defence sufficiency level.

In terms of personnel selection and staffing military units in the process of raising their professional level on contractual basis, military personnel was selected on the territorial and domicile principle. Military occupation of the Crimea by Russia demonstrated the fallacy of this territorial principle when contracted Ukrainian servicemen with domicile in the peninsula changed sides and rendered their service to aggressor without effective resistance. If lessons learned, the exterritorial system for military personnel selection should get into place. Renewal, modernization and procurement of up to date military equipment is an important policy line that has never been implemented, only on a single case basis in the period of two decades. Modernization of national mobilization preparedness system is totally destroyed and plundered. The system of local military registration and enlistment offices (commissariats) is partially destroyed.

Tasks of the Armed Forces and their uses. Chapter IV of the National Military Strategy of Hungary clearly formulates the national defence task of Hungarian Armed Forces. It stresses that their key task is to defend, on their own or collectively, the independence, territory, air space, population and resources of Hungary in the face of external aggression. Hungary must satisfy its obligations related to membership in the Alliance as well as other international obligations, in particular, related to collective defence and crisis resolution, humanitarian issues, trust and security building.
While implementing these tasks, Hungarian defence forces must be ready to take part in the broad range of operations, low to high intensity ones. Involvement in high intensity conflicts is reserved to the mid-term prospect.

The Military Doctrine of Ukraine formulates the tasks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and options of their uses in a manner totally different from the National Military Strategy of Hungary.

1. The strategic tasks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are formulated with respect to a military conflict, not the national defence.
2. Immediate use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is not stipulated at all in the case of armed aggression against Ukraine, and rebuff of aggression must take place through “aggressor’s waiver of further use of military force and complete restoration of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine as well as extension of guarantees and inflicted losses indemnity” (Article 31). Who and how will force an aggressor to a waiver remains unknown.
3. In case of an armed clash, the recommendation is not to use the Armed Forces, but “reach an agreement between the conflicting parties” on waiving the demands that violate the constitutional regime and territorial integrity of Ukraine, on further use of military force and on disarmament of illegal militarized or armed units. Who is offered to be Ukraine’s counterpart in reaching an agreement? Is it an aggressor? In other words, Article 31 if the Military Doctrine to Ukraine suggests simultaneous being a party in a conflict and a mediator in negotiations with an aggressor.
4. Article 32 of the Military Doctrine stipulates that Ukraine shall not be the first to use the Armed Forces, and this stand promoted military occupation of the Crimea by Russian troops. In real terms it means that in future Russia can carry out military occupation of Ukraine without a single shot.
5. In case of an armed conflict or aggression at the state border of Ukraine, it is planned to use the Armed Forces in compliance with plans to use them and exercise territory defence, however, there were no plans of this kind. There is an additional recommendation to appeal to states-guarantors that signed the Budapest Memorandum as well as to the UN Security Council. Everybody is aware of zero effectiveness of these appeals when an armed conflict expands.
6. Receipt of military assistance from other states and international organizations is not excluded, however, nothing is said about from whom non-bloc Ukraine can get this support and which state may have courage to render it when there are no legal grounds.

Findings. The Military Doctrine of Ukraine needs a general overhaul of its content and concepts in compliance with the existing military realities and intention to get integrated in the EU.

Can we make use of the Hungarian expertise to formulate and implement the national military strategy? Maybe we can, but only when Ukraine waives its non-bloc status and makes choice in favour of the model governed by the principle of collective defence. We have to take into account the fact that the Government of Ukraine does not consider this model to be appropriate, that makes this expertise beneficial for Ukraine just partly, specifically with respect to the issues of efficient and rational use of limited resources; enhancement of the military reserve system, of operations involving national defence forces, of their tasks in regional conflicts, of the Armed forces operative command; implementation of the integrated and module systems; improving military units capability to operate in the autonomous mode.

Changes should be made in terms of in-depth Ukraine-EU cooperation in security and defence areas as well as compliance with demands of the European integration. First and foremost, we need to change military and political guidelines in managing the Armed Forces. The
key principles of freedom extend from political frames and return to the system of democratic control over the Armed Forces and other enforcement units of Ukraine, including its parliamentary and civil aspects.

Another important security related issue of the European integration is availability of adequate resources and efficiency of the Armed Forces units in cooperation with the EU. Herewith, compared to Hungary, Ukraine has far greater potential and takes a significantly larger part in the EU international security measures.

Cooperation with the EU in security and defence area takes place in the framework of the *Working Plan on Cooperation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the European Council Secretariat*. Development of military and political dialogue entails working sessions of the Chief of General Staff – the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - with the Chairman of the Military Committee of the European Union. The topics of these consultations relate to development of military and political dialogue, involvement of units and facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in crisis resolution operations under the EU leadership as well as service on duties as a component in the EU combat tactical unit. Together with the European Defence Agency (EDA) Ukraine defined the lines for Ukraine’s cooperation and participation in the EU projects of mutual interest.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine keep being involved in the EU operation “EU NAVFOR ATALANTA”. Much has been done to involve units and facilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the EU HELBROC combat tactical unit together with Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus. HELBROC duty in the EU is scheduled for the first half-year in 2014. Additionally, Ukraine may get involved in the EU combat tactical unit together with the Visegrad 4 member states (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic).\(^9\)

**Deeper mutual relations between Ukraine and the European Union promoted increase in weight of Ukraine in the European security and defence system and in the implementation of Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities as a key element in its European integration.** Further cooperation of Ukraine with the EU in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework should be guided by the following priorities:

- expanding the format of military and political dialogue;
- training of Ukrainian officer personnel at EU education institutions;
- preparation to participate in the multinational peace keeping exercise and logistic support to the EU operations;
- involvement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the EU combat tactical groups.\(^10\)

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\(^10\) Ibid